General Patton
3rd Army Commander
Oct 6 - Nov 18
The Lorraine Campaign and the drive to metz
Even though Carl entered the theater of war on October 3, 1944 he didn't see combat until November 18 during the Battle of Metz. General Eisenhower concluded that opening the passage to the deep water port of Antwerp was to take priority, and the Lorraine Campaign was to pause in operations in early October until the passage was secured. Resources, men and materiel were commited to that effort in the North by both the Germans and the Allies. Patton's 3rd Army prepared and manuvered against German forces to the South as a delaying and diverting action. The 3rd Army essentially trained at the coming strategies that would eventually result in the allied victory and capitulation of Metz while keeping pressure on the German forces causing them to defend Metz and also attend to the advances toward Antwerp. Carl and his companions were held in *reserve in the rear eschelon until finally reporting on November 14, 1944 to the 10th Infantry Regiment positions at the Chesny Forest. The passage to Antwerp was realized and the October pause concluded. The drive to Metz had began again in earnest.
the drive to metz
With XX Corps including the 95th Division and 10th Armored Division began their northern attack on Metz, 5th Division continued, who had been engaged since early October began its attack toward the city on 16 November. The whole operation was slowed by the inability of the 10th Infantry to make a rapid forward move while the bulk of the 2d Infantry was held at the Nied River. (see map to left.) In the afternoon the 3d Battalion of the latter regiment pushed north toward Frontigny and came abreast of the right-flank battalion of the 10th Infantry Regiment, which thus far had been *echeloned to the rear.
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The forward lines of the 10th came within sight of Magny; Marly, the scene of bitter fighting on the previous day, was finally cleared of the last enemy. The 11th Infantry found itself in a hornet's nest at the Frescaty airfield, where a fortress machine gun battalion was deployed, and both the 1st and 2d Battalions were thrown into the battle to drive the Germans from the hangars and bomb shelters surrounding the field. In the meantime, the 3d Battalion was left behind to contain the Verdun forts, manned by the 48th Fortress Machine Gun Battalion. These works were finally encircled on the night of 16-17 November. As the day ended the left and center of the 5th Division were only about four thousand yards from the center of Metz. The bag of prisoners was swelling rapidly, but thus far the determined troops of the 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment and the fortress machine gun units showed no signs of abandoning their attempts to hold at each step of the way.
With the withdrawal of the 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, however, German resistance weakened on 17 November. The 10th and 2d Infantry Regiments, minus the battalion across the Nied, were able to move more rapidly. The minor forts lying in the path of their advance were quickly overrun or found unoccupied, and by midafternoon patrols from the 10th were at the Metz city limits. The general advance was stopped by Fort Queuleu, which the enemy apparently intended to defend. This was one of the old works on the inner ring of forts. The two battalions of the 11th Infantry, aided by tanks of the 735th Tank Battalion, continued the fight at the airfield. At the end of the day only a few Germans were left to defend the hangars on the northeastern edge of the field and the fight shifted toward Fort St. Privat, whose fire checked a further advance on the right. The reinforced battalion holding the bridgehead east of the Nied River began a withdrawal to the west bank on orders from General Patton, the 6th Armored Division to hold the bridges while the 5th Reconnaissance Troop patrolled along the west bank. Patrols from the 5th Division had reported earlier that the Germans were escaping "in droves" through the gap still open east of Metz, and this may explain why the Third Army commander decided to assemble the entire 2d Infantry west of the Nied.
All through the night the 2d Infantry fought its way toward the north, prompted by exhortations from General Patton and the XX Corps commander to speed up the advance. On the morning of 18 November the key road and rail center at Courcelles-sur-Nied fell into American hands. General Irwin thereupon ordered the 2d Infantry, now with all three battalions in line, to push hard on its left so as to aid the advance of the 10th Infantry into Metz. This attack had reached and captured Ars-Laquenexy when, about 1945, General Walker phoned General Irwin and ordered him to press straight to the north and there meet the 90th Division, thus cutting the last escape routes to the east. Colonel Roffe, the 2d Infantry commander, detached his 1st Battalion reinforced by a company of tanks, for the mission. About 1030 on 19 November, these troops of the 5th Division joined hands with cavalry elements of the 90th Division north of Retonfey--so completing the encirclement of Metz.
Over in the 10th Infantry sector on 18 November the 1st Battalion bypassed the 2d Battalion--which was deployed around Fort Queuleu--and entered Metz. Carl wrote of the battle, "The “Bloody Diamond” took Metz and Co B was the farthest into the city first. Co E, 10th Infantry officially given credit, but they held up at a fort on the city limits. We went right into the center of town." This was Carl's battalion and they were given credit for being first to enter the city center.
MEN OF 5TH INFANTRY DIVISION ENTER METZ on 18 November (above) and the next day (right) conduct a house-to-house search in this city.
At 1140 the next morning the 10th Infantry met patrols from the 95th Division near Vallières, just south of St. Julien-lès-Metz. The 11th Infantry also crossed the Metz limits on 18 November and by the night of 19 November had mopped up most of the streets and houses between the Moselle and the railroad loop in the southwest quarter of the city. The 2d Battalion, however, continued to be held in check by the stubborn defenders at Fort St. Privat.
The capitulation of metz
The remnants of the 1215th Regiment were hemmed in around the St. Quentin works. The 1010th Security Regiment, which no longer had any semblance of organization, clustered around Plappeville. The 462d Fuesilier Battalion, having given a good account of itself, had withdrawn to Fort Jeanne d'Arc, where it was joined on 17 November by most of the staff of the 462d VG Division. The 1217th Regiment, its ranks depleted, formed a new line of defense around Fort Driant. The 22d Fortress Regiment had splintered into fragments with detachments in and around the forts at St. Privat, Queuleu, and St. Julien. About four hundred stragglers had been gathered to defend the old barracks on the Ile Chambière.
On 16 November Kittel committed the last of his sparse reserves to defend on the north, south, and west of Metz. The eastern side of the city was undefended, except by the few troops maintaining a tenuous connection with the field forces of the First Army. Now General Knobelsdorff sent word to the beleaguered commander that on 17 November the First Army would detach itself from the Metz garrison and begin a withdrawal to new positions farther east, thus ending the drag of what one German general had called "the leaden weight" around the neck of the First Army command. The last of the German civilian population was escorted from the city by four motorized companies of Feldgendarmerie sent from Darmstadt, and Kittel's command was left to its fate. On the night of 16-17 November the 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment made its move east through the narrowing escape route, apparently acting on Hitler's earlier order that no part of the 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division (already on the roster of units for the Ardennes counteroffensive) should be entrapped inside of Metz. No word of this withdrawal reached Kittel until the morning of 17 November when he suddenly was informed that the 38th had deserted the Metz garrison. Pleas for help from all the forts and sectors of the Metz front flooded General Kittel's headquarters on 17 November. There was nothing left for the German commander to do, however, but give orders that the Moselle bridges be blown and make preparations for a house-to-house defense of the city itself. 50
These last dispositions of the broken units under Kittel's command were based on no thoroughgoing plan, nor was further co-ordination between units possible. On the evening of 17 November the central exchange for the underground telephone system, located on the Ile Chambière, ceased to function and Kittel's over-all command ended. A few of the Germans outside the forts tried to make a fight for it in these last hours, but most were content to fire a few shots and then march into the American lines with their hands in the air. No real house-to-house battle was waged in the city of Metz, despite futile attempts to defend some of the headquarters buildings. By the night of 19 November American mopping-up operations were well along. On 21 November a patrol from the 95th Division found General Kittel in an underground field hospital, badly wounded (he had been fighting in the line) and under morphine. The next afternoon hostilities formally ceased--although a number of the forts continued to hold out. The 462d VG Division no longer existed. German sources later estimated that the actual casualties in the defense of Metz had been four hundred dead and some twenty-two hundred wounded, about half of whom had been evacuated before the city was encircled. But to these losses must be added those inflicted on the 416th Division, the 19th
Since General Walker had forbidden direct assault against the holdout forts, and since artillery ammunition had to be carefully conserved to support the projected XX Corps drive to the Sarre River, the German garrisons were left to wither on the vine. One by one the isolated German forts succumbed. Fort Verdun surrendered on 26 November. Fort St. Privat capitulated with its garrison of five hundred on 29 November, after four American field artillery battalions and three 155-mm. self-propelled guns had shelled the fort. At the end of November, Forts Driant, Jeanne d'Arc, St. Quentin, and Plappeville still held out, forcing General Irwin to use most of the 2d Infantry and one battalion of the 11th Infantry to contain them. To this extent at least the Metz garrison carried out the orders given by Hitler. Short rations and general demoralization eventually took their toll even in those forts where determined German officers were able to keep their men in hand. On 6 December Fort St. Quentin surrendered with a sizable garrison. Fort Plappeville followed the next day. Then, by one of the fortunes of war, Fort Driant capitulated to the 5th Infantry Division at 1545 on 8 December--about fifteen minutes before the incoming 87th Division relieved the 5th. Fort Jeanne d'Arc, probably because it was officered by the 462d VG Division staff and garrisoned by the Fuesilier Battalion, was the last of the Metz forts to fall. Its garrison surrendered to the III Corps, which by then had taken over the Metz area, on 13 December.
The credit for the envelopment of Metz and the final reduction of its defenses must be given to the combined ground forces which took part in the operation, since continuous bad flying weather had permitted only occasional intervention in the battle by the air arm. This operation, skillfully planned and marked by thorough execution of the plan, may long remain an outstanding example of a prepared battle for the reduction of a fortified position. However, determined enemy resistance, bad weather and attendant floods, plus a general tendency to overestimate the strength of the Metz fortifications, all combined to slow down the American offensive and give opportunity for the right wing of the German First Army to repair the tie between the LXXXII Corps and XIII SS Corps in time for an organized withdrawal to the Sarre River.